

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5597

EXDIS

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SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: COMMENTARY ON THE FRENCH DRAFT OF A
NATO DECLARATION OF THE FIFTEEN

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POLICY

1. COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF THE FRENCH DRAFT OF A NATO DECLARATION HAS CENTERED UNTIL NOW ON OMISSIONS IMPORTANT TO ONE OR ANOTHER ALLY: BURDENSARING, MBFR, CONSIDERATION OF CANADA'S SITUTAION, DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES, THE ENVIRONMENT, THE THIRD WORLD, TRADE AND MONETARY MATTERS, AND OTHER NON-SECURITY SUBJECTS. THE FRENCH DELIVERED AN EXPANDED DRAFT ON NOVEMBER 12 THAT TAKES CARE OF MOST OF THE OMISSIONS. BEFORE PROCEEDING IT MIGHT BE USEFUL NOW TO TURN FROM THE SPECIFIC AND GIVE THOUGHT TO THE BASIC THEME AND ARGUMENT OF THE ENTIRE FRENCH TEXT WHICH U.S. HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR FURTHER EFFORTS.

2. THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH OF APRIL 23, WHICH STARTED THE ALLIANCE ON THE PROJECT OF WRITING A DECLARATION, SET FORTH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES, AMONG OTHERS: TO PUT THE ALLIANCE ON A SUSTAINABLE BASIS; TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE IMPACT OF DETENTE IN REDUCING PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE CONTINUING DANGER AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUED DEFENSE; CONSIDER MONENTARY AND TRADE MATTERS IN RELATION TO
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SECURITY, BECAUSE THEY ARE "LINKED BY REALITY"; ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF A "NEW GENERATION" BORN SINCE WORLK WAR II; SEEK TO REPLACE FEARS, NO LONGER STRONGLY FELT, BY ASPIRATIONS, AS THE BASIS OF THE ALLIANCE; SUPPORT EUROPEAN UNIION, NOT AS AN END

IN ITSELF BUT AS A COMPONENT OF ATLANTIC PARTENERSHIP; AND FIND A BASIS OF AFFILIATION WITH JAPAN IN THE NON-DEFENSE ASPECTS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO GUIDE THE US. IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE DECLARATIONS BOTH WITH THE EC AND IN THE NOTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. THE VIEW OF THE APRIL 23 SPEECH WAS THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FACES COMMON CHALLENGES AND DANGERS TO WHICH COMMON RESPONSES CAN AND MUST BE JOINTLY FORMULATED. ALTHOUGH THE APPROACH WAS BROAD AND GLOBAL, THE SENSE OF STRONG TIES BINDING THE U.S. AND EUOPE PARVADES THE SPEECH.

3. THE FRENCH DRAFT STARTS FROM A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE ALLIANCE, AND, AT PRESENT, BYPASSES MANY OF THE KISSINGER OBJECTIVES, AND SUGGESTS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. THE ORIGINAL FRENCH DRAFT WAS SILENT ON ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, PARTNERSHIP, AND BONDS THAT LINK ALLIES WHO HAVE A COMMON HERITAGE AND PROFOUND SHARED EXPERIENCE; IT BARELY MENTIONED RELATIONS OTHER THAN THESE HAVING TO DO WITH SECURITY. THE REVISED FRENCH DRAFT IS AN IMPROVEMENT. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT YET MEASURE UP AS THE "ACT OF CREATION" CALLED FOR BY SECRETARY KISSINGER. IT REMAINS ESSENTIALLY A STATIE AND IN SOME WAYS REGRESSIVE VIEW OF THE ALLIANCE. RATHER THAN SEEING THE ALLIANCE AS A RELATIONSHIP WHICH CAN EVOLVE TO MEET THE NEW CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FRENCH TEXT SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IS ESSENTIALLY A WASTING ASSET, ALTHOUGH IT ADMITS IT WILL BE A LONG TIME IN PASSING. IF THAT IS THE U.S. VIEW, POLICY, AND WISH, THEN OUR COURSE OF ACTION IS CLEAR. IF, HOWEVER, THE U.S. VIEW, AS EXPRESSED IN THE KISSINGER SPEECH IS THAT THERE IS A DESIRE TO HAVE THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP EVOLVE TO SUSTAIN A U.S.-EUROPEAN LINK DIRING THE PERIOD AHEAD WHEN U.S. POWER ALONE MAY BE LESS OF AN INFLUENCE THAT IN THE PAST, THEN U.S. AMENDMENTS TO AND U.S. SUPPORT FOR AMENDMENTS OF OTHER ALLIES O THE FRENCH DRAFT IN THE COMING DAYS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THAT LIGHT.

4. MOST OF THE ALLIED NATIONS FAVORABLE REMARKS ABOUT THE FRENCH TEXT DIRECTLY FOLLOWED AND FLOWED FROM THE VERY POSITIVE POSITION TAKEN BY THE U.S. WE SHOULD DECIDE NOW HOW THE PRESENT FRENCH TEXT MIGHT BE IMPROVED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEPENDENCE OF
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EUROPE ON U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES IS STRESSED; HOWEVER, THERE IS IMPLICIT IN THE TEXT A "WE" AND "THEY" ATTITUDE IN WHICH THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ARE NOT FULLY STATED, NOT TO MENTION ANY EUROPEAN OBLIGATIONSOR COMITMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES. THUS, THE FRENCH DRAFT TAKES AS A STARTING POINT THE "NEW SITUATION" RESULTING FROM STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY, WHICH THE DRAFT SAYS GIVES THE U.S. IN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, A POSITION OF "GREAT STABILITY" IN WHICH EUROPE DOES NOT SHARE. IT SAYS, IN EFFECT, THAT THE ALLIES DO NOT FACE A COMMON DANGER; THE U.S. AND EUROPE FACE DIFFERENT DANGERS, AND THEIR DEFENSE NEEDS HAVE DIFFERENT CHARACTERS. THE FRENCH NATO DRAFT DOES NOT GO QUITE SO FAR AS THE US-EC DRAFT IN SPEAKING OF THE U.S. "ON THE ONE HAND" AND EUROPE "ON THE OTHER HAND" BUT

ONLY THOSE PHRASES ARE MISSING. TO SEE HOW SIGNIFICANT THE DICHOTOMY IS, NOE NEED ONLY ATTEMPT TO EDIT OUT THE WORKDS U.S. AND EUROPE AND SUBSTITUTE "THE WHOLE ALLIANCE," OR SOME SIMILAR UNITARY PHRASE; IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN ONE PLACE IN THE REVISED DRAFT, BUT IN MOST PLACES IT CANNOT BE DONE. THE THEME OF US-EUROPEAN SEPARATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE SEEMS CENTRAL TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE FRENCH DRAFT. IF THAT IS THE U.S. VIEW, THEN OUR COURSE IS CLEAR. WHILE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE U.S. AND EUROPE COULD BE DIFFERENT, THE FRENCH DRAFT TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 3 COULD BE SEEN AS PRESUPPOSING U.S. NONINVOLVEMENT IN A EUROPEAN-SOVIET CRISIS OR CONFLICT. TO THE EXTENT THAT U.S. BEHAVIOUR IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE WOULD BE TO CONSIDER U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AS INSEPARABLE, THEN PARAGRAPH 3 MIGHT BE MISLEADING.

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5. THE IDEA OF "TWO POLES" OR "TWO PILLARS" WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS HARDLY ALIEN TO U.S. THINKING. IF THIS IS WHAT THE FRENCH ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP, THERE CAN BE NO U.S. OBJECTION TO IT. HOWEVER, AS IT SUGGESTED BELOW, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE MESSAGE IS LESS BENIGN: ONE WAY TO READ THE MESSAGE IS THAT SINCE THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS DO NOT FACE THE SAME DEFENSE PROBLEM, AND SINCE THERE IS "AT PRESENT" NO ALTERNATIVE TO U.S. NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT, THE EUROPEANS SHOULD WRING FROM THE U.S. THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PLEDGES AND, IN THE MEANTIME, BUILD THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEIR SEPARATE IDENTITY AND DEFENSE, ON TWO ASSUMPTIONS: ONE, DEFENSE REALITIES INDICATE DIVERGENT POLICIES, AND, TWO, OTHER BONDS ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO HOLD THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER.

6. ONE ARGUMENT OF THE FRENCH TEXT IS THAT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAS RESULTED IN A "GREAT STABILITY" BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. IT IS NOT AT ALL THE SAME FOR EUROPE, THEY SAY; EUROPE IS STILL "PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO ALL OTHER KINDS OF CONFLICT." THE TEXT SUGGESTS THAT EUROPE DOES NOT SHARE IN THE U.S. STABILITY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, AND "THE PROBLEM OF ITS DEFENSE ACQUIRES FROM THIS FACT A CHARACTER MORE AND MORE SPECIFIC," THAT IS, MORE AND MORE UNLIKE THE PROBLEM OF THE

DEFENSE OF THE U.S.

7. THE FOUNDATION OF THE FRENCH DRAFT, THAT EUROPE AND THE U.S. ARE NOT IN THE SAME BOAT, IT EMPHATIC AND CLEAR, BUT THE LOGIC OF WHAT FOLLOWS FROM IT IS LESS CLEAR. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIFFERENT SITUATIONS OF EUROPE AND THE U.S, ACCORDING TO THE
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FRENCH DRAFT, SEEMS TO BE THAT THE U.S. MUST RE-AFFIRM ITS TOTAL COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THE "NEW SITUATION" IS SAID NOT TO CHANGE THE DEFENSE NEEDS OF EUROPE IS THAT ONE ESSENTIAL. THE TEXT SAYS, "AS MATTERS STAND AT PRESENT, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE SECURITY PROVIDED BY U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES." THE TEXT SAYS THAT THE RESKS EUROPE FACES MUST BE ASSESSED, BUT NO SIGNIFICANT NEW ACTION IS PROPOSED FOR THE PRESENT. WHILE CONTINUING TO BIND THE U.S. TO PLEDGES OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT, THE DRAFT TEXT URGES ONLY THAT THE EUROPEANS MAINTAIN THEIR OWN FORCES AT A HIGH LEVEL, AND FOR THE FUTURE, THE PROGRESS OF THE EC TOWARD POLITICAL UNITY "SHOULD, IN DUE COURSE, FAVORABLY EFFECT THE CONTRIBUTION" THE EUROPEAN ALLIES MAKE TO THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE.

8. THE BASIC FRENCH-TEXT ARGUMENT IS THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT SHARE THE DANGERS THAT EUROPE MUST LIVE WITH. BUT, THE FACT IS THAT, BY COMMITTING ITSELF TO THE TOTAL DEFENSE OF EUROPE, THE U.S. COMMITS ITSELF, AS A FULL PARTNER, TO ALL OF THE DANGERS THE EUROPEANS FACE. THE THEME OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ITSELF IS THAT THE DANGER OF ONE IS THE DANGER OF ALL. BUT THE FRENCH FORMULATION PRESENTS THE ALLIANCE IN A DIFFERENT FORM AND THUS RAISES THE QUESTION OF REDUCING THE DETERRENT; ONE MIGHT ASK WHY SHOULD THE U.S. JEOPARDIZE ITS "GREAT STABILITY" WITH THE USSR BY A TOTAL COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE? MORE BLUNTLY, WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE U.S.? PART OF THE ANSWER IS THAT WE HAVE A COMMON HERITAGE, AND STAND FOR THE SAME THINGS IN THE WORLD, AND HAVE BEEN THROUGH A LOT TOGETHER, AND SOME OF THOSE THINGS HAVE BEEN WRITTEN INTO THE REVISED DRAFT OF THE DECLARATION. ANOTHER PART OF THE ANSWER IS THAT WE HAVE SHARED INTERESTS AND RELATIONS--ECONOMIC, TRADE, MONETARY--THAT WOULD BENEFIT FROM GREATER CO-OPERATION, AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THEY TOO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN, OR AT LEAST ALLUDED TO. BUT HARD JUSTIFICATION OF A U.S. COMMITMENT HAS YET TO BE WRITTEN IN, IN EITHER DECLARATION, AND ITS ABSENCE IS PARTICULARLY NOTICEABLE IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF THE POST-MIDDLE EAST RECRIMINATIONS. HOWEVER IT IS DONE, THERE MUST BE LANGUAGE THAT IS ELOQUENT, AND REASONING THAT SPEAKS FORCEFULLY BOTH TO THE WARSAW PACT TO BE CREDIBLE AND TO THE U.S. TO BE SUSTAINABLE TO JUSTIFY THE U.S. COMMITMENTS TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE (COMMITMENTS IN THE FRENCH DRAFT, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT COULD BE SEEN TO BE BEYOND THE CAREFULLY GUARDED FORMULATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
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TREATY ITSELF, ARTICLE 5). ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN THE DECLARATIONS ACHIEVE SOME OF THE OBJECTIVE S OF THE SPEECH OF APRIL 23.

9. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TEXT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR USE IN IMPROVING THE DECLARATION. IS THERE A "GREAT STABILITY" IN US-USSR RELATIONS, OR WOULD "SOMEWHAT REDUCED INSTABILITY" BE MORE ACCURATE? DOES THE U.S. WANT THE ALLIANCE TO DECLARE THAT THE U.S. AND EUROPE FACE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT DEFENSE PROBLEMS, WHICH COULD BE SEEN AS AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE US MIGHT NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE FACE OF CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE AND THUS COULD AFFECT THE DETERRENT. OR SHOULD WE RATHER PROCLAIM THAT BECAUSE OF THE COMMITMENT WE SEE THE DEFENSE OF THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE AS AN INDIVISIBLE DEFENSE PROBLEM IN WHICH WE ALL SHARE? WHAT IS MEANT BY THE ASSERTION THAT THE PROBLEM OF EUROPE'S DEFENSE "IS TAKING ON A DIMENSION OF ITS OWN?" WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORDS "AS MATTERS STAND AT PRESENT" (FOURTH PARA)? IS THE PLEDGE IN THE SIXTH PARA MORE SWEEPING THAN THE COMMITMENT OF ASSISTANCE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (ARTICLE 5)? IF SO, WHY IS THAT THE CASE, AND MIGHT IT NOT REQUIRE RATIFICATION? WHY MUST WE AWAIT THE PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY FOR A FAVORABLE EFFECT ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN MEMBERS TO THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE? IF EUROPE IS ENJOYING "AN UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF PROSPERITY" (FIRST PARA) AND "MUST TAKE GREATER ACCOUNT OF THE RISKS CONFRONTING IT" (FIFTH PARA), WHY SHOULD NOT THEIR CONTRI-BUTION BE "FAVORABLY AFFECTED" NOW? IS IT CONSITENT TO SPEAK OF THE DIFFERENT DEFENSE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS (THIRD PARA) AND ALSO TO SAY THAT "COMMON DEFENSE IS ONE AND INDIVI-SIBLE" (SEVENTH PARA)? WHEN EUROPE IS SPOKEN OF, DOES THAT INCLUDE ONLY THE ALLIES WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE EC, OR IS IT MEANT ALSO TO INCLUDE TURKEY, GREECE, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, AND ICELAND?

10. COMMENT: THE U.S. HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY FAVORABLE TO THE FRENCH POSITION AND DRAFT, BUT WHITHOUT YET EMBRACING IT, IN THE NAC. THE RESULT IS THAT THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN GOING ALONG. THE U.S. MAY NOW WANT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO USE THE THIRTEEN ALLIES TO MOVE THE FRENCH TOWARD A DESIRED U.S. POSITION. AT PRESENT, THERE IS A CONCLUSION ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES THAT THE U.S. AGREES WITH THE FRENCH POSITION EXPRESSED IN THE FENCH DRAFT. IF THAT IS NOT COMPLETELY CORRECT, U.S. APPROACH AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE NEEDED VERY
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SOON. I RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE NO DESIRE FOR A CON-FRONTATION WITH FRANCE. HOWEVER, THE EFFECT OF OUR APPROACH IN THE COUNCIL THUS FAR GOES BEYOND THE AVOIDANCE OF A CON-FRONTATION. THE EFFECT IS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIRECT INFLUENCE ON THE FRENCH, IN THE NAC, NOR THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIRECT INFLUENCE ON THE FRENCH BY LETTING THE OTHER THIRTEEN ALLIES HELP TO MOVE THEM
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